



























































The aim of this paper is to study the longstanding relationship between corporate tax 
avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital in Europe, taking into consideration 
country-specific characteristics, which are essential in a context of corporate tax 
competition amongst European countries. We find that investors’ apprehend tax 
avoidance differently at distinct levels of tax avoidance. We provide evidence that as 
low-tax avoidance firms engage in greater tax avoidance, the ex ante equity cost of 
capital appears to decrease. On the contrary, when high-tax avoidance firms undertake 
greater levels of tax avoidance, the ex ante equity cost of capital appears to increase. 
These results imply that there is a non-linear, convex relationship between tax 
avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital. Finally, we explore the impact of 
institutional characteristics, countries’ legal origin, on the relationship between tax 
avoidance an ex ante equity cost of capital. Results from this additional analysis are 
inconclusive, thus it remains uncertain whether institutional characteristics (legal origin) 
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A presente dissertação pretende analisar a relação entre o nível de planeamento fiscal e 
o custo de capital ex ante na Europa, tendo em consideração as características 
específicas de cada país dado o contexto de maior concorrência fiscal entre empresas. 
Os resultados obtidos mostram que os investidores têm uma percepção diferente sobre o 
nível de planeamento fiscal praticado consoante a evolução deste. A análise realizada 
evidencia que à medida que o nível de planeamento fiscal adoptado aumenta de um 
nível baixo (low tax avoidance) para um nível mais elevado (high tax avoidance), o 
custo de capital ex ante decresce. Por outro lado, os resultados mostram também que se 
o nível de planeamento fiscal praticado se continuar a expandir no mesmo sentido, de 
um nível elevado para um nível muito superior, o custo de capital ex ante aumenta. Os 
resultados empíricos demonstram que há uma relação não-linear e convexa entre o nível 
de planeamento fiscal adoptado e o custo de capital ex ante. Por último, é considerado o 
efeito da origem legal do país em que cada empresa está sediada na relação entre o nível 
de planeamento fiscal adoptado e o custo de capital ex ante. Os resultados desta análise 
são inconclusivos, não sendo possível isolar um efeito específico da origem legal do 
país em que cada empresa está sediada sobre a relação entre o nível de planeamento 
fiscal praticado e o custo de capital ex ante. 
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What is the impact on the ex ante equity cost of capital when firms deviate from (and 
subsequently move towards) their optimal level of tax avoidance amongst European 
firms? The effect of corporate taxation on cost of capital and capital structure has been 
discussed in the literature since the seminal paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958).  
Several studies are grounded in the theory of Modigliani and Miller (1958), although the 
relation between corporate tax avoidance and cost of capital has received little attention. 
Several authors have explored numerous factors that may be related with the association 
between tax avoidance and cost of capital, such as Moore (2012) that investigated the 
relationship between tax risk and firm value, and El Ghoul et al. (2011) which examined 
the association between tax authority enforcement and cost of equity capital. Recently, 
Cook, Moser and Omer (2015), in a study focused in the US, propose a nonlinear 
convex relationship between corporate tax avoidance and ex ante (i.e, beforehand) cost 
of capital: when firms with a low level of tax avoidance engage in additional tax 
avoidance, the firm’s ex ante equity cost of capital decreases. On the other hand, when 
firms with a high level of tax avoidance engage in greater corporate tax avoidance, the 
firm’s ex ante equity cost of capital increases. Somehow, Cook, Moser and Omer (2015) 
aim to address an optimal level of corporate tax avoidance, which minimizes the ex ante 
equity cost of capital, and thus enhances firm’s value. Despite the significant 
contribution of their work to understand the longstanding relationship between 
corporate tax avoidance and cost of capital, that is a US-specific study, thus their 
conclusions may well do not hold in a context of more corporate tax competition. That 
is to say, investors response to changes in the level of corporate tax avoidance of 
European firms must take into consideration country-specific characteristics. Therefore, 




(2015) analysis to listed European firms, in order to assess whether there is a U-shaped 
relationship between corporate tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital amongst 
European countries (as displayed in Figure 1). Secondly, to determine whether 
countries’ institutional characteristics (namely, its legal origin) shape the effect exerted 
by tax avoidance on the ex ante equity cost of capital. 
Scholes et al. (2009) infer that there are certain non-tax costs that affect firm’s tax 
avoidance activities. These non-tax costs may be indirect and difficult to quantify 
monetarily, such as the opacity of financial statements along with challenging tax 
strategies.  Investor’s perception of tax avoidance can be understood as an indirect non-
tax cost, such that it is a key element when examining the association among firm’s tax 
avoidance activities and ex ante equity cost of capital. On the other hand, interest and 
penalties paid upon audit and fees paid to tax consultants responsible for the elaboration 
and implementation of the tax strategies are quantifiable and direct non-tax costs. In the 
words of Scholes et al. (2009: pp. 13), “Tax planning is a tax-favored activity in that the 
investment is tax deductible and the payoffs (reductions in tax payable) are tax exempt. 
The higher the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate, the higher the returns for tax planning”. 
Profitable tax avoidance strategies that allow for a decrease in a firm’s tax burden are 
associated with complex investment decisions and transactions management, which 
enables for an increase of the firm’s future cash flows. As cash savings from tax 
planning can be used to fund rewarding investment opportunities, one can forecast that 
these tax cash outflows will lead to greater expected future cash flows. Hence, firms 
mostly engage in tax avoidance activities with the aim of reducing their tax burdens and 
increasing their after-tax income, generating greater cash flows for the shareholders. 
In this study, tax avoidance is defined following that in Hanlon and Heitzman (2010). It 




avoidance strategies, such as transfer costs, earnings management and tax credit 
management in order decrease their explicit taxes. As firm’s expectations cannot be 
strictly measured and often not all expectations are realized, the ex ante measure – 
exogenous approach – is the most appropriate measure for the cost of capital. The ex 
ante approach is based on the constant dividend growth model and on the consensus of 
financial analyst’s five year earnings growth forecasts provided by I/B/E/S. 
The empirical analysis uses an unbalanced dataset that comes mainly from Thomson 
Reuters Eikon, including I/B/E/S, and comprises 2,810 firm-level observations of firms 
listed on the stock exchanges of 24 European countries from 2005 to 2014.  
This analysis begins by confirming the U-shaped association between tax avoidance and 
ex ante equity cost of capital.  Next, we estimate two measures of tax avoidance to 
examine the relationship between tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital - and 
tripartite our sample – low, medium and high level of tax avoidance. We infer that as 
tax avoidance increases from lower avoidance to higher avoidance, the ex ante equity 
cost of capital appears to decrease, which indicates that investors’ perception of tax 
avoidance changes from inauspicious to auspicious. That is to say, investors recognize 
the benefits of tax avoidance to surpass the costs. On the other hand, as tax avoidance 
increases from higher avoidance to even greater levels, the ex ante equity cost of capital 
appears to increase, indicating that investors perceive the costs of tax avoidance to 
surpass the benefits. Thus, firms that exhibit low levels of tax avoidance are able to 
decrease ex ante equity cost of capital by undertaking greater levels of tax avoidance, 
whereas firms that exhibit greater levels of tax avoidance are able to decrease ex ante 
equity cost of capital by decreasing tax avoidance. Following La Porta et al. (1998) 
insights, we also analyze the effect of different legal origins (English common law, 




between tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital. Given the current global tax 
competition, some firms moved their headquarters to lower tax jurisdictions. Thus, 
firms may exhibit differences between the country in which they operate and the 
country’s stock exchange in which they are listed. Results from this additional analysis 
is inconclusive, thus it is inexplicit whether institutional characteristics (legal origin) 
have an impact on the effect exerted by tax avoidance on cost of capital.  
Our findings make contributions to the literature in the sense that the results regarding 
the U-shaped relationship between tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital are 
based on European firms whereas previous literature focus on US firms. Moreover, we 
assess whether the U-shaped relationship holds for different legal origins amongst 
European countries, and find out that such relation is inconclusive. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature 
review and the research hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and empirical methods 
used to perform the analyses. Section 4 reports our main results, and section 5 concludes 
the study. 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Corporate tax avoidance and cost of capital  
The academic literature has been paying little focus on the relation between corporate 
tax avoidance and cost of capital, despite the significant literature focused on capital 
structure. Recently, several authors have explored several factors that may be related 
with the association between tax avoidance and cost of capital, such as tax risk (Moore, 
2012), investors’ perception of tax avoidance (Cook, Omar and Moser, 2015), equity 
risk incentives (Rego and Wilson, 2012), reputational costs (Gallemore et al, 2014 and 




Moore (2012) provide fairly compelling empirical evidence that the relationship 
between tax risk and firm value is concave – “firm value is increasing in tax risk at a 
diminishing rate until an optimal level is reached, after which firm value is decreasing” 
(Moore, 2012). The author used US firm-year observations ending between December 
16, 2007 and July 31, 2011 that are included in the CRSP-Compustat Merged Database 
there is an optimal level of tax risk, leading investors to value tax risk as long as the tax 
savings exceed the tax costs. From this level onwards, an increase in tax risk will lead to 
a decrease in firm value, thus, investors will require a higher rate of return to engage in 
risky tax position when it comes to uncertain outcomes that may harm firm value.  
Similar intuition can be found when considering investor’s expectations towards an 
optimal level of corporate tax avoidance. Cook, Omar and Moser (2015) demonstrate 
that firms try to coordinate their actual levels of tax avoidance with investors’ 
expectations (optimal level). The authors find that as the deviations from those optimal 
levels of tax avoidance decrease, the ex ante equity cost of capital declines. Moreover, 
the authors also find that the investors’ perception of tax avoidance changes with the 
level of tax avoidance as they are concerned about the expected costs of increasing tax 
avoidance overstepping the expected benefits – the investor’s perception of tax 
avoidance will vary from favorable to unfavorable as the level of tax avoidance 
increases.  
Following Scholes et al. (2009) framework, Kim et al. (2015) find evidence that firms 
actually tend to converge to a certain level of tax avoidance, regardless of their initial 
level of tax avoidance being above or below their target level of tax avoidance. The 
authors suggest that firms whose actual cash effective tax rate is above their target 
exhibit a faster convergence towards its target level of tax avoidance when compared 




al. (2015) infer that firms with a low level of tax avoidance engage in additional tax 
avoidance at a faster rate when compared to the rate at which high tax avoidance firms 
diminish their tax avoidance. One can understand that firms face a clear tradeoff when 
moving towards optimal levels of tax avoidance. Furthermore, each firm has a certain 
optimal level of tax avoidance and this level evolves and adjusts throughout time. 
Changes in cost of capital imply variations in firm’s value. Nonetheless, literature argue 
that associations between tax avoidance and firm value may be conditional on the level 
of income mobility. For instance, De Simone and Stomberg (2012) consider that a firm 
is income mobile if it can attain sustainable tax savings from tax planning for a long 
period of time, investors perceive income mobile firms positively due to the overall tax 
burden reduction. The authors provide evidence that for income mobile firms, there is a 
positive relationship between tax avoidance and firm value arising from a sustainable 
scenario, as firms are able to retain a substantial fraction of the benefits obtained 
through tax avoidance. Nonetheless, tax avoidance arising from aggressive and 
unsustainable strategies is associated with a decrease in firm value due to the increased 
likelihood of facing penalties from tax authorities. Overall, the authors suggest that 
investors’ perception of tax avoidance differs at different levels of tax avoidance. De 
Simone et al. (2014) find that current and long-run cash tax savings from income mobile 
firms are highly valued by investors when compared with those of non-income mobile 
firms, as lower cash effective tax rates are linked to greater Tobin’s Q. The authors also 
infer that these income mobile firms are less risky and usually undertake long-term tax 
avoidance. Taken together, these findings suggest that income mobile firms efficiently 
engage in greater corporate tax avoidance with less risk.  
Rego and Wilson (2012) infer that there is a non-linear link between equity risk 




greater equity risk, although equity risk incentives and higher levels of corporate tax 
avoidance are positively associated. Equity risk incentives and higher levels of 
corporate tax planning are positively associated due to investors’ perception of risky tax 
positions as a valuable strategy to achieve higher stock return volatility that allows for 
an increase of stock option portfolio values. Recently, Hutchens and Rego (2015) study 
the relationship between risky tax positions and firm value. The authors suggest that 
more aggressive forms of tax avoidance are associated with greater tax risk, which leads 
to a higher cost of equity capital. Thus, the level of a firm’s tax reserves is positively 
related with the cost of equity capital. The authors concluded that investors will demand 
a higher rate of return to engage in uncertain tax positions. 
Reputational penalties are non-tax costs of corporate tax avoidance that may justify why 
some tax avoidance strategies are penalized by investors. Gallemore et al. (2014) 
provide evidence that there are no relevant reputational penalties due to tax-sheltering 
participation after analyzing a sample of firms publicly identified as tax-shelter users. 
Regarding reputational costs due to tax planning, Graham et al. (2014) survey results 
suggest that reputational costs are a determinant factor for firms that consider engaging 
in tax avoidance. Their findings provide evidence that the unfavorable impact of 
reputational concerns constraint the extent to which firms undertake tax avoidance. 
Ayers et al. (2009) and Graham et al. (2014) findings are consistent with the reasoning 
concerning the right side of the proposed U-shaped association between tax avoidance 
and ex ante equity cost of capital, as cost of capital is increasing in tax avoidance. 
Following Ayers et al. (2009), an increase of tax avoidance leads to greater information 
asymmetry, which results in higher cost of capital. Graham et al. (2014) results indicate 





Wilson (2009) infer that tax-shelter firms exhibit greater abnormal returns while 
involved in tax shelter and these abnormal returns are associated with  high-powered 
corporate governance. Some authors find evidence that investors may perceive 
positively aggressive tax reporting. For instance, Frischmann et al. (2008) demonstrate 
that there is a positive association between the fraction of tax reserves that allows for 
permanent tax savings and the additional returns generated in the first-quarter earnings 
announcement, suggesting that investors positively perceive aggressive tax reporting. El 
Ghoul et al. (2011) find that there is a negative association between tax authority 
enforcement and cost of equity capital as an increase in tax authority enforcement will 
generate a decrease in the cost of equity, thus increasing firm value.  Most recently, 
Klassen, Lisowsky and Mescall (2016) study the association between the tax preparer 
type and the firm’s tax aggressiveness, considering the auditor, external non-auditor and 
internal tax department as possible parties responsible for the firm’s tax compliance 
function. Regarding this subject the authors find that firms require more aggressive tax 
positions when the party responsible for the firm’s tax compliance function is an 
external non-auditor or the internal tax department. Also, auditor-provided tax services 
are associated to higher levels of tax aggressiveness. Finally, Big 4 tax preparers are 
related to lower levels of tax aggressiveness.  
Cook et al. (2008) examine if managers differ investments in tax planning in order to 
decrease their effective tax rates, i.e. if a firm’s earnings are managed through changes 
in their effective tax rates, mainly between the third and the fourth quarter. The authors 
investigate the effect of auditor-provided tax services and find that the amount of tax 
fees paid to an external auditor is directly related to a significant decrease in the 




Erickson et al. (2004) study the tax consequences and the ex post costs of fraudulent 
earnings overstatement. The authors show that firms are willing to pay taxes to the IRS 
on fraudulently overstated financial accounting earnings. Erickson et al. (2004) infer 
that when a firm is indicted of overstating financial accounting earnings and there is 
public disclosure regarding the overstatement, managers tend to comprise those 
earnings on corporate tax returns.  
A firm with greater accounting information quality is able to assess its cash flows more 
efficiently, which increases information certainty and allows for a decrease in the cost 
of equity capital. Allen et al. (2015) and Chen and Lin (2014) investigate the effect of 
financial analysts coverage on corporate tax avoidance. The evidence for the negative 
impact of analyst coverage on tax avoidance is clearer for firms that combine distinct 
factors such as weaker corporate governance, opaque information environments and 
greater reputational concerns. Chen and Lin (2014) find that firms which experience an 
exogenous reduction in the number of analysts following the firm engage in greater tax 
avoidance when compared to firms that do not face this exogenous reduction of analyst 
coverage. Allen et al. (2015) demonstrate that the negative effect of financial analysts 
on corporate tax avoidance suggests that financial analysts’ monitoring constraints 
corporate tax avoidance – financial analysts diffuse firm’s private information to market 
participants which potentially increases the probability of publicly revealing the firm’s 
tax avoidance conduct -, such that firms that comprise more financial analysts tend to 
undertake less aggressive tax avoidance positions. Regarding disclosure policy and the 
cost of capital, Francis et al. (2005) suggest that firms that are included in industries 
with higher external financing requirements exhibit greater voluntary disclosure levels, 




extended disclosure. Francis et al. (2005) assert that these results hold despite cross-
country institutional differences in legal and financial systems.  
Ayers et al. (2009) perceive information content as the mightiness of book income and 
estimated taxable income to resume relevant information concerning stock returns. The 
authors find that high tax avoidance firms disclose lower information content of taxable 
income to book income when compared to other firms, hence, investors impound 
information concerning a firm’s tax avoidance level within stock price.  
. 
2.2 Unfavorable impact of tax avoidance 
In the literature there are findings inconsistent with those of Cook, Omar and Moser 
(2015) and Moore (2012), which suggest a U-shaped relationship between corporate tax 
avoidance and cost of capital. For instance, Sikes and Verrecchia (2014) demonstrate 
that a negative externality occurs throughout the whole economy when a relevant 
percentage of firms in an economy undertake tax avoidance - it will result in higher 
covariance risk between the market cash flows and a firm cash flow, which leads to a 
higher cost of capital for all firms in the economy. These results are reasonable 
regardless of whether each specific firm does or does not engage in tax avoidance. The 
authors find that, in general, the greater the percentage of firms that engage in tax 
avoidance the greater will be the externality’s outcome. Thus, the cost of capital will 
increase only if a relevant percentage of firms in an economy undertake tax avoidance. 
Sikes (2016) perceives a negative financial externality subsequent to tax avoidance 
embracement: there is an overall increase in cost of capital as more firms engage in tax 
avoidance, even for firms that do not engage in tax avoidance.  They focus on the risk 




Kim et al. (2011) investigates the extent to which tax avoidance leads to a future stock 
price crash risk and infer that there is a positive association between corporate tax 
avoidance and firm-specific stock price crash risk for firms with lower long-run cash 
effective tax rates and higher book-tax differences. As corporate tax avoidance is a 
useful mechanism that allows for managerial opportunistic conduct and suppresses 
negative operating outcomes, a firm’s poor performance may remain hidden within the 
firm until a certain tipping point after which there is an asset price crash – eventually, 
investors will mistrust the quality of the firm’s earnings.  
Dhaliwal et al. (2006) demonstrate that “the implied cost of equity capital is increasing 
in leverage”, which means that leverage has a positive effect in the cost of equity as 
long as we are at an optimal level in which the after-tax return on equity outweighs the 
after-tax return on debt. On the one hand, “the effect of leverage on the firm’s cost of 
equity is decreasing in the firm’s tax benefit from debt” (Dhaliwal et al. 2006), such that 
the corporate taxes have a negative impact on the risk premium from leverage as long as 
we are at an optimal level in which the after-tax return on equity outweighs the after-tax 
return on debt – thus, as the corporate tax benefit from the interest expense deduction 
increases, the effect of leverage on cost of equity decreases, the tax benefit from debt 
allows for a decrease in the cost if equity and increases market value. On the other hand, 
“the effect of leverage on the firm’s cost of equity is increasing in the personal tax 
penalty associated with debt” (Dhaliwal et al. 2006), it occurs because investors require 
higher relative pretax returns when the tax on interest income increases comparatively 
to the tax rate on equity, to balance the outcome on an after-tax basis. This leads to a 
positive association between equity risk premium from leverage and personal tax 




2.3 The role of institutional characteristics 
For fiscal years starting after January 1
st
 2005 the European Union (EU) Parliament 
adopted the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), which required 
consolidated and simple accounts for all EU listed firms. The adoption of IFRS aims to 
contribute for the convergence and harmonization among European firms and to allow 
for an improvement in comparability of financial statements across countries as well as 
in accounting quality. Despite the adoption, differences still persist across countries in 
terms of accounting practices, which inevitably are linked to tax issues. Thus, we 
explore the effect of legal origin on the association between tax avoidance and ex ante 
equity cost of capital. Soderstrom and Sun (2007) claim that the information asymmetry 
may not decrease when firms prepare their financial statements according to the IFRS, 
rather than to the domestic accounting standards. Information asymmetry affects 
accounting quality, whereas a country’s legal and political system has an indirect impact 
on both accounting quality and tax avoidance. Legal origin has been widely studied in 
the literature after the seminal work of La Porta et al. (1998). Thus, the relation between 
tax avoidance and cost of capital may well vary according with country level 
characteristics such as its legal origin. 
3 Hypotheses development, Data and Research Design 
3.1 Research Hypotheses 
This study complements prior literature by addressing the issue of whether there is a 
disparity in the association between the level of tax avoidance and investors’ perception 
of tax avoidance as the level of tax avoidance varies, in a form of a U-shaped relation as 




As the academic literature has been paying little focus on the relationship between ex 
ante equity cost of capital and deviations from expected levels of tax avoidance in 
Europe, the following research question arises: 
Research Question: Does the association between ex ante equity cost of capital and 
corporate tax avoidance vary with the level of tax avoidance amongst European firms? 
Considering that investors benefit from more certain cash flows, as long as tax 
avoidance expected benefits exceed the expected costs the ex ante equity cost of capital 
may decrease. Nevertheless, when the expected costs outweigh the expected benefits, 
the cash flows will be less certain leading to an increase in the ex ante equity cost of 
capital. This forecast is tested through the following research hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The ex ante equity cost of capital decreases when firms engaged in lower 
corporate tax avoidance increase their level of corporate tax avoidance. 
Hypothesis 2: The ex ante equity cost of capital increases when firms engaged in higher 
corporate tax avoidance increase their level of corporate tax avoidance.  
Moreover, Soderstrom and Sun (2007) assert that countries’ legal origin may mold the 
influence of tax systems of accounting quality, which may well implicitly affect investors’ 
perceptions and cost of capital. Thus, the institutional characteristics (legal origin) might 
change the effect exerted by tax avoidance in the ex ante equity cost of capital. The third 
research hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: The association between tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital 
varies with countries’ legal origin. 
3.2 Sample Selection 
The empirical analysis uses an unbalanced dataset that comes mainly from Thomson 




on the principal stock indexes of 24 European countries. Several observations were 
excluded due to insufficiency of data to calculate the tax avoidance measures, the 
measure of ex ante equity cost of capital, and the control variables. The analysis runs 
from 2005 to 2014, and the final sample comprises 2,810 firm-year observations of 
1,057 firms listed on the stock exchanges of 24 European countries. 
3.3 Measuring Ex Ante Equity Cost of Capital 
Following Omer et al. (2015), Equity cost of capital is generated as a measure of ex ante 
equity cost of capital, as defined in Easton (2004). Easton (2004) aims to attain a 
forecast for the equity cost of capital measure (ex ante equity cost of capital).  
Equity cost of capital is calculated as of December 31
st





                                                                          (1) 
𝐸𝑅 =  √
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+2 −  𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡
                                                                   (2) 
in which 𝑃𝑡 is the price of the stock in December of year t; 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑃𝑆 is the 
forecasted earnings per share for future period t+1 and t+2. 𝐸𝑅 is the measure of 
estimated ex ante equity cost of capital for t+1. Equation (1) is transformed to obtain 
𝐸𝑅. Easton (2004) demonstrates that in order to obtain 𝐸𝑅, which is the solution of this 
quadratic equation, one must rely on the observed prices and forecasts of earnings and 
dividends. Earnings forecasts are not available for many firms because several firms do 
not have analysts’ coverage that issue earnings forecasts. Moreover, equation (2) cannot 
be solved when 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1is greater than 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+2. As investment 
decisions have to be made beforehand of knowing all of the significant information, 




capital. We use the ex ante approach because the ex post cost of capital would imply a 
world of more certainty. Further details can be found in Appendix B. 
3.4 Measuring Tax Avoidance 
TaxAv comprises the measures of tax avoidance: either cash effective tax rate (CETR), 
or book effective tax rate (BETR). Cash effective tax rate reveals the actual cash tax 
payments to the tax administration for a firm’s certain level of pretax income. Attending 
Dyreng et al. (2008), CETR is computed as cash taxes paid each period divided by the 
corresponding pretax book income. All observations with negative cash taxes paid or 
negative pre-tax income are excluded. CETR with observations higher than 1 or lower 
than 0 are excluded. This particularly pertains to firms with negative pretax book 
income. As higher CETR prompts lower levels of tax avoidance, CETR is multiplied by 
-1, such that tax avoidance is increasing in CETR – this measure varies in the range 
between 0 and -1. CETR is used instead of LCETR because we have an unbalanced 
sample in this study, so it is difficult to track the cash effective tax rate over a long time 
period. The second measure of tax avoidance is the firm’s book effective tax rate 
(BETR). BETR
1
 is computed as tax expense divided by pretax book income. Following 
the same line of reasoning as in CETR, BETR is multiplied by -1, such that tax 
avoidance is increasing in BETR – this measure varies in the range between 0 and -1. 
3.5 Research Design 
This section describes the conducted research design. To infer the association between 
tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital and to test the veracity of our research 
hypotheses, the following Ordinary Least Squares regression model
2
 with robust 
standard errors was estimated:  
                                                          
1
 All observations with negative tax expense or negative pre-tax income are excluded. 
2
 In order to assess the presence of multicollinearity, we used the VIF – Variance Inflation Factor - 




𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛𝐵𝑀𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐵_𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵_𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵_ℎ𝑚𝑙𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐺𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 +
𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡_𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 +
𝛽14𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑐,𝑡 +  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 +
 𝑒𝑖,𝑐,𝑡                                                                                                                                                   (3)               
The dependent variable Equity cost of capital is the ex ante equity cost of capital from 
Easton (2004), per firm i, listed in country c, for the year t+1, as described in 3.3. It is 
conjectured that this variable is affected by tax avoidance, measured as either CETR or 
BETR. We predict a U-shaped relationship between ex ante equity cost of capital and 
tax avoidance (measured by the coefficient 𝛽1), suggesting that when firms with low 
levels of tax avoidance engage in additional corporate tax avoidance, the firm’s ex ante 
equity cost of capital decreases (H1); whereas, when firms with high levels of tax 
avoidance engage in greater tax avoidance, the firm’s ex ante equity cost of capital 
increases (H2).  
As prior literature endorses, several variables may affect Equity cost of capital. As in 
Gebhardt et al. (2001) research, proxies for the log of total assets (LnAT) and the log of 
the book-to-market ratio (LnBMRatio) are included. Regarding LnAT, we foresee a 
negative coefficient, which suggests that larger firms bear lower ex ante equity cost of 
capital. The three Fama-French factors (BMKT, BSMB and BHML) are included in order to 
control for firm’s risk. As prior literature suggests that firms comprising higher risk 
usually have greater ex ante equity cost of capital, one expects positive coefficients for 
                                                                                                                                                                          
VIF varies between 1.05 and 3.22. We also assessed for differences in variance error terms across 
observations, in order to test for homoscedasticity of errors. Nevertheless, presented in Tables 4, 5 and 
6 are robust standard errors. Furthermore, statistical tests were performed to assess for normality of 




the three Fama-French factors. The three factors were estimated per each firm and year, 
through the following OLS model:  
𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝑙 + 𝜖𝑖                                                                (4) 
where, 𝑅𝑖 is the portfolio’s expected rate of return, 𝑅𝑓 is the risk free rate of return and 𝑅𝑚 
is the market portfolio’s rate of monthly return. 𝑆𝑀𝐵 (small minus big) measures the spread 
in returns between small capitalization over big capitalization firms, whereas 𝐻𝑀𝐿 (high 
minus low book-to-market ratio) measures value stocks over growth stocks. Data on all 
dependent variables in equation (4) was obtained from Kenneth R. French - Data Library 
which was computed based on portfolios of companies from 16 European countries.
3
 𝑅𝑖 
was obtained from Thomson Reuters Eikon. We estimated the three Fama-French factors 
for all firms in the sample, per month, grouped monthly data (by mean) per year, and 
added to Equation (3) the coefficients 𝑏𝑖, 𝑠𝑖, and ℎ𝑖, which where further labeled as  
𝐵_𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑖,𝑡, 𝐵_𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑖,𝑡, and 𝐵_ℎ𝑚𝑙𝑖,𝑡, respectively. 
Following Dhaliwal et al. (2006), we control for leverage (Leverage) which is defined 
as long-term debt scaled by total assets. We expect positive coefficients for Leverage as 
prior literature endorses that the cost of equity and leverage are positively related. In 
addition, to control for tax avoidance due to depreciation deductions we include 
PPEGT, gross property plant and equipment divided by total assets – these fixed 
tangible assets are expected to generate economic benefits for the firm. Nonetheless, 
PPEGT’s value is usually adjusted on an annual basis as tangible fixed assets’ value 
decreases due to use and amortization (except land). In order to control for firm’s 
profitability, we include the return on total assets (ROA). Following Hutchens and Rego 
(2015), we comprise control variables for analyst forecast bias (Forecast_Bias) and 
                                                          
3





expect positive coefficients for Forecast_Bias as higher analyst forecast bias gives rise 
to greater ex ante equity cost of capital. As pointed out by Allen et al. (2015) and Chen 
and Lin (2014), the number of analysts following firms play an important role tax 
avoidance and, consequently, in the accuracy of estimated ex ante equity cost of capital. 
Thus, the variable 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 captures the number of analysts providing earnings 
forecasts. Total Accruals (TA) aims to capture tax avoidance arising due to earnings 
management, and it is computed as earnings before taxes minus operational cash flow, 
scaled by yeart−1total assets. The only control at country level applied in the base 
estimation is a measure of culture of a country (defined as Trust in politicians). Trust in 
politicians is, according to Robinson and Slemrod (2012), the most coherent and crucial 
non-tax rate determinant of the variability in tax systems across countries, considering a 
set of 10 non-tax rate variables. 
To control for absent country-level factors, we apply a fixed effect specification for 
country, industry and year. Given the current global tax competition, some firms moved 
their headquarters to lower tax jurisdictions. Thus, firms may exhibit differences 
between the country in which they operate and the country’s stock exchange in which 
they are listed. Therefore, we include a fixed effect specification denoted as 
Headquarters. In order to infer these cross-country differences we perform a more 
comprehensive analysis concerning the effect of legal origin on the association between 
tax avoidance and cost of capital, by grouping countries according to their legal origin 
following La Porta et al. (1998).  All variables are defined in Appendix A – Variable 
definitions. 
3.6 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical model. The 




of capital) of 12.29 percent (9.99 percent), congruous with Easton (2004). Equity cost of 
capital varies from 0 to 299.7 percent and it presents a standard deviation of 0.122. For 
the entire sample of 2,810 observations, we find that the mean (median) firm has a cash 
effective tax rate (CETR) of -28.96 percent (-18.83 percent). CETR varies from -0.989 
to 0 and exhibits a standard deviation of 0.188. We report a mean (median) book 
effective tax rate (BETR) of 18.09 percent (14.22 percent). BETR varies from -1 to 0 and 
presents a standard deviation of 0.160. Table 3 presents the correlation matrix for the 
variables included in the empirical model. Our dependent variable Equity cost of capital 
is significantly correlated with BETR (-0.078). The correlation between Equity cost of 
capital and CETR is negative (-0.012) but not significant, perceivably due to the 
proposed non-linear association between tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of 
capital. The results indicate that our tax avoidance measures are significantly, positively 
correlated (0.063) with one another, as expected. The positive and significant 
correlation between CETR and BETR implies that both measures are correlated with 
each other, but CETR and BETR capture, individually, a distinct understanding of 
corporate tax avoidance.  
Table 2 exhibits a mean (median) LnAT of the firms is 21.75 (21.54). LnAT varies from 
14.94 to 29.17 and it presents a standard deviation of 2.227. The natural log of the book-
to-market ratio defined as LnBMRatio, presents a mean (median) of -0.863 (-0.816) and 
a standard deviation of 0.897, it varies from -5.456 to 6.772. Regarding the three Fama-
French factors, B_mkt presents a mean (median) of 0.007 (0.006) and a standard 
deviation of 0.009, whereas B_smb and B_hml present 0.003 (0.002) and 0.004 (0.0005) 
mean (median), respectively. B_smb and B_hml display a standard deviation of 0.022 
and 0.033, respectively. Forecast_Bias exhibits a mean (median) of -0.067 (-0.051) and 




captures the number of analysts that provide earnings forecasts to the firms, its mean 
(median) corresponds to 13 (11) and its standard deviation is 9.604. This variable 
exhibits a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value of 43, 153 firms comprise 1 
analyst, whereas only 1 firm has 43 analysts. The firm’s total accruals, entitled as TA, 
captures tax avoidance that arises due to earnings management, it presents a mean 
(median) of -0.005 (-0.009) and a standard deviation of 0.074. Total accruals fluctuate 
between -0.551 and 0.750. The variable Trust exhibits a mean (median) of 4.195 (4.060) 
and a standard deviation of 1.173.  
Additionally, Table 3 also exhibits the importance of comprising our control variables 
in the model as several control variables are significantly, positively correlated with 
Equity cost of capital and with one another. Equity cost of capital is significantly 
positively correlated with LnBMRatio, PPEGT, Forecast_Bias and Trust. Equity cost of 
capital is significantly negatively correlated with CETR, BETR, LnAT, B_smb, B_hml, 
Leverage, ROA, Capex, Analysts and TA. 
4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Tax Avoidance and Ex ante equity cost of capital 
In Panels A and B of Table 4 we investigate whether ex ante equity cost of capital 
varies with the level of tax avoidance.  Hypotheses 1 and 2 forecast that the relationship 
between tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital varies along with the level of 
corporate tax avoidance. Hence, to test these hypotheses we tripartite our sample - the 
sample is divided into terciles, each containing a third of the total sample - according to 
each measure of tax avoidance , and analyze the association between tax avoidance and 




In both Panels the dependent variable is Equity cost of capital, the first column 
corresponds to firms engaged in lower levels of tax avoidance, the second column 
corresponds to Medium Tax Avoidance and the third column corresponds to firms 
which present higher levels of corporate tax avoidance. In Panel A the tax avoidance 
measure is CETR whereas in Panel B is BETR.  
Panel A exhibits a negative coefficient for low avoidance CETR and a significantly 
positive coefficient for high avoidance CETR.  The negative sign for low avoidance 
CETR in column (1) indicates that the ex ante equity cost of capital decreases as tax 
avoidance increases, for firms with low levels of tax avoidance. The positive signal for 
high tax avoidance (CETR) in column (3) means that the ex ante equity cost of capital is 
increasing in tax avoidance for firms with high levels of tax avoidance. These results 
provide strong support for the second research hypothesis. 
Panel B presents a significantly negative coefficient for low avoidance BETR and a 
significantly positive coefficient for high avoidance BETR. Consistent with the results 
for CETR, the negative sign for low avoidance BETR indicates that the ex ante equity 
cost of capital decreases when low avoidance BETR increases, for firms undertaking 
low levels of tax avoidance. The positive sign for high avoidance BETR means ex ante 
equity cost of capital is increasing in tax avoidance for firms undertaking high levels of 
tax avoidance. These results provide strong support for the first and second research 
hypothesis. 
These findings indicate that at low levels of tax avoidance investors recognize that the 
expected benefits of increasing tax avoidance might overstep the expected costs, 
whereas at high levels of tax avoidance investors appear to recognize that the expected 
costs of increasing tax avoidance surpass the expected benefits. Consistent with 




differently at different levels of tax avoidance, which is consistent with Cook, Moser 
and Omer (2015) findings.  
In Panel A, LnBMRatio presents significant and positive coefficients, suggesting that 
firms that reveal both greater growth opportunities often exhibit higher ex ante equity 
cost of capital. The coefficients on B_smb Fama-French factor are positive and 
statistically significant, as expected, revealing that firms that bear greater risk exhibit 
higher ex ante equity cost of capital. The coefficient on Leverage is generally positive, 
which suggests that firms with higher leverage exhibit higher ex ante equity cost of 
capital. PPEGT and Capex are included in order to control for firm activities that may 
affect tax avoidance measures, the coefficients on PPEGT and Capex are generally 
positive and significant. Forecast_Bias exhibits negative and statistically significant 
coefficients. The coefficients on the variable Analysts are generally negative which 
suggests that there is a negative association between ex ante equity cost of capital and 
the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts. That is to say, the ex ante equity 
cost of capital decreases as the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts 
increases. Allen et al. (2015) findings are consistent with that of ours – more analysts 
following decrease information asymmetry, and thus the implied cost of equity capital. 
The coefficients on the variable TA, Total Accruals, are also negative and statistically 
significant, indicating that there is a negative association between ex ante equity cost of 
capital and total accruals. This is consistent with prior literature that supports the idea 
that managing tax expense is a direct mechanism of earnings management that allows 
managers to meet earning’s targets. 
Panel B presents significant and positive coefficients for LnBMRatio, suggesting that 
firms that reveal both greater growth opportunities often exhibit higher ex ante equity 




and significant for low levels of tax avoidance and positive and statistically significant 
for high levels of tax avoidance, as expected, revealing that firms that bear greater risk 
exhibit higher ex ante equity cost of capital. The coefficients on Capex are generally 
positive and significant. The coefficients on the variable TA, Total Accruals, are also 
negative and statistically significant, indicating that there is a negative association 
between ex ante equity cost of capital and total accruals.  
4.2 The Role of Legal Origin 
In Table 5, Panels A and B we investigate whether countries’ legal origin has an impact 
on the effect exerted by tax avoidance on the ex ante equity cost of capital, considering 
low and high levels of tax avoidance separately.  Hypothesis 3 forecasts that the 
association between tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital varies with 
countries’ characteristics, namely legal origin. Hence, to test this hypothesis we divide 
our sample in two parts according to each measure of tax avoidance (for CETR in Panel 
A and for BETR in Panel B), and analyze the impact of four legal origins (English 
common law, French civil law, German civil law and Scandinavian civil law) on the 
association between tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital for low and high 
levels of tax avoidance. In contrast to the approach in Table 4, the sample in Table 5 is 
only divided into two parts due to a small sample size. 
In both panels the dependent variable is Equity cost of capital and the columns are 
organized by legal origin according to each level of tax avoidance (low and high). In 
Panel A the tax avoidance measure is CETR whereas in Panel B is BETR.  
Dividing the sample according to each firm’s legal origin lead to a reduction of the 
number of observations in each regression, which affects the regressions’ explanatory 
power. Thus, several coefficients are not statistically significant when the tax avoidance 




avoidance measure is BETR. This means that it is not possible to clearly isolate the 
effect of legal origin on the relationship between tax avoidance and cost of capital. 
Nevertheless, with awareness that the effect exerted by legal origin on the association 
between tax avoidance and cost of capital is uncertain, we proceed with the analysis of 
the regressions’ coefficients. 
Firms based in countries using English common law present a negative coefficient for 
low avoidance CETR and a positive coefficient for high avoidance CETR, as is 
displayed in Panel A. Although the coefficients are not statistically significant, the 
coefficients’ signs are consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2, the ex ante equity cost of 
capital decreases when low avoidance CETR increases and the ex ante equity cost of 
capital increases when high avoidance CETR increases. Firms based in countries using 
German civil law and in countries using Scandinavian civil law present similar results to 
firms based in countries using English common law. In Panel B we find an inverse 
association, the ex ante equity cost of capital increases when low avoidance BETR 
increases and decreases when high avoidance BETR increases. For firms based in 
countries using French civil law, the ex ante equity cost of capital increases when firms 
engaged in both low and high levels of tax avoidance increase its levels of corporate tax 
avoidance, using CETR as tax avoidance measure. Using BETR as tax avoidance 
measure, we find that firms based in countries using French civil law present negative 
signs for low and high avoidance BETR indicating that the ex ante equity cost of capital 
decreases when low and high avoidance BETR increases. Firms based in countries using 
German civil law and in countries using Scandinavian civil law present similar results to 
firms based in countries using French civil law. 
These findings indicate that the country’s institutional characteristics change the effect 




affects differently the association between tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of 
capital. Consistent with hypothesis 3, these findings suggest that the association 
between tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital varies with countries’ legal 
origin. Nevertheless, as several coefficients are not statistically significant, it is not 
possible to clearly isolate the effect of legal origin on the relationship between tax 
avoidance and cost of capital. 
4.3 Robustness Check 
Additionally, in Table 6 we perform a robustness check of the results. We used the main 
model and excluded 92 observations considered as outliers due to excessive cost of 
capital. We used standard deviation to detect these 92 outliers, any observation that 
exhibits more than two standard deviations is considered an outlier.  Table 6 presents 
the OLS estimation results using CETR and BETR as tax avoidance measure in Panels A 
and B, respectively. The coefficients are robust and plausible when compared to Table 4 
coefficients, indicating structural validity of the model. 
5 Conclusion 
Following the significant and recent contribution of El Ghoul et al. (2011), Moore 
(2012) and Cook, Moser and Omer (2015) to understand the longstanding relationship 
between corporate tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital for the US, this study 
examines the association between corporate tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of 
capital in Europe, though taking into consideration country-specific characteristics, 
which are essential in a context of more corporate tax competition.  
Our results suggest that investors’ perception of tax avoidance appear to change at 
different levels of tax avoidance. We provide evidence that as tax avoidance increases 




decrease, which indicates that investors’ perception of tax avoidance changes from 
unfavorable to favorable, this is to say that investors recognize the benefits of tax 
avoidance to surpass the costs. On the other hand, when firms that undertake high levels 
of tax avoidance engage in greater tax avoidance the ex ante equity cost of capital 
appears to increase, indicating that investors perceive the costs of tax avoidance to 
surpass the benefits. These results imply that the relationship between tax avoidance and 
ex ante equity cost of capital is U-shaped.  
Additionally, we investigate whether the countries’ institutional characteristics (legal 
origin) might change the effect exerted by tax avoidance in the ex ante equity cost of 
capital, conjecturing that the association between tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost 
of capital may well vary with countries’ legal origin (English common lay, French civil 
law,  German civil law and Scandinavian civil law). Our results indicate that the 
country’s institutional characteristics change the effect exerted by tax avoidance in the 
ex ante equity cost of capital and that each legal origin affects differently the association 
between tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital.  
Our results support Cook, Moser and Omer (2015) analysis. Firstly, our results indicate 
that ex ante equity cost of capital changes with investors’ perception of tax avoidance. 
Secondly, we provide evidence that there is a nonlinear, convex relationship between 
tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital. Finally, we infer that firms that engage 
in either too much (above median level) or not enough (below median level) tax 
avoidance exhibit greater ex ante equity cost of capital, suggesting that firms may seek 
to adjust their actual tax avoidance levels with these expected levels.  
Our findings make contributions to the literature in the sense that the results regarding 
the U-shaped relationship between tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital are 




try to understand whether such relation varies with countries legal origin, although  it is 
uncertain whether institutional characteristics (legal origin) have an impact on the effect 
exerted by tax avoidance on cost of capital because several coefficients are not 
statistically significant. Therefore, it is not possible to clearly isolate the effect of legal 
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7.1 Appendix A – Variable definitions 
Table 1 - Variable Definitions 
   
Variable Source Definition 
Equity cost of capital c Ex ante equity cost of capital from Easton (2004), calculated as of 
December 31 following the close of the fiscal year. See Appendix 
B. 
 






CETR is computed as cash taxes paid each period divided by the 
corresponding pretax book income. All observations with negative 
cash taxes paid or negative pre-tax income are excluded. CETR with 
observations higher than 1 or lower than 0 are excluded.  
LCETR a Long-run cash effective tax rate, measured as the sum of cash tax 





a BETR is computed as tax expense divided by pretax book income. 
All observations with negative tax expense or negative pre-tax 
income are excluded. 
 
LnAT c The natural log of the firm’s assets (AT). 
   
LnMVE a Log of market value of equity, in which market value of equity is 
derived from year end stock price. 
 
LnBMRatio c The natural log of the book-to-market ratio is computed as book 
value of equity divided by market value of equity. 
 
B_mkt 




The Fama and French (1993) risk factors are computed by 
regressing a firm’s annual stock returns. See chapter 3.4. 
PPEGT 
 
c Gross Property Plant and Equipment (PPEGT) scaled by beginning 
of the year total assets (AT). 
 
Leverage a Financial leverage, measured as long-term debt over lagged total 
assets. 
 
ROA c Return on Assets, computed as pre-tax income (PI) divided by total 
assets (AT). 
 
Capex c Total capital expenditures for the fiscal year (Capex), scaled by 




c An estimate of IBES analysts EPS forecast bias, calculated as the 
prior year earnings per share forecast from IBES minus this year’s 
net income, scaled by beginning of the year total assets. 
Analysts a The variable Analysts captures the number of analysts providing 
earnings forecasts. 
TA c Total Accruals, aims to capture tax avoidance arising due to 
earnings management, it is computed as earnings before taxes 




   
Trust c Cultural variable concerning trust in politicians, following Robinson 
and Slemrod (2012). 
Legal Origin c Legal origin following La Porta et al. (1998). Legal origin is equal 
to 1 if the origin is English common law, 2 if the origin is French 
civil law, 3 if the origin is German civil law and 4 if the origin is 
Scandinavian civil law. 
i  Firm 
c  Country in which the firm is listed 
t  Year of data 
 
a
 Thomson Reuters DataStream / Eikon 
b
 Annual Fama and French (1993) factors are available at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/f- f_factors.html.  
c






7.2 Appendix B – Cost of capital measure 
Equity cost of capital is generated as a measure of ex ante equity cost of capital, as 
defined in Easton (2004). Equity cost of capital is calculated as of December 31
st
 




                                                                          (1) 
𝐸𝑅 =  √
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+2 −  𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡
                                                                   (2) 
in which 𝑃𝑡 is the price of the stock in December of year t; 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑃𝑆 is the 
forecasted earnings per share for future period t+1 and t+2. 𝐸𝑅 is the measure of 
estimated ex ante equity cost of capital for t+1. Equation (1) is transformed to obtain 
𝐸𝑅. 
 
𝐸𝑅 =  √




𝑃𝑡  is the price of the stock in December of year t 
𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆 is the forecasted earnings per share for future period t+1 and future period t+2 






7.3 Appendix C – Figures 
Figure 1 - U-shapped relation betweeen corporate tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of 
capital 
 
The U-shaped association between tax avoidance and ex ante equity cost of capital is 
presented in the figure below. It states that when firms with a low level of tax avoidance 
engage in additional tax avoidance, the firm’s ex ante equity cost of capital decreases. 
On the other hand, when firms with a high level of tax avoidance engage in greater 










7.4 Appendix D - Tables 
Notes:  
Equity cost of capital is the ex ante equity cost of capital from Easton (2004). CETR is computed as the 
firm’s cash taxes paid divided by pretax income less special items. BETR is computed as the firm’s 
income tax expense divided by pretax income less special items. LnAT is the natural log of the firm’s total 
assets. LnBMRatio is computed as the log of the book value of equity divided by the market value of 
equity. B_mkt, B_smb, B_hml are estimates from de Fama and French three-factor model, these factors 
are included in order to control for risk. Leverage is long-term debt scaled by total assets. PPEGT is gross 
property plant and equipment scaled by beginning total assets. ROA assesses the firm’s return on its 
assets, it is computed as net income divided by beginning assets. Capex assesses total capital expenditures 
for the fiscal year scaled by beginning total assets. Forecast_Bias measures the bias in I/B/E/S analysts 
estimated measured as the prior year’s one year ahead earnings per share minus current year actual 
earnings per share, all scaled by beginning total assets. The variable Analysts captures the number of 
analysts providing earnings forecasts. Total Accruals, TA, aims to capture tax avoidance arising due to 
earnings management, it is computed as earnings before taxes minus operational cash flow, scaled by 
yeart−1total assets. Trust is a cultural variable concerning trust in politicians, following Robinson and 
Slemrod (2012). Trust presents 300 observations, as this variable exhibits one observation per year and 
per country. See Appendix A for variable definitions.
         
         
Variable N Min 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75% Pctl Max Mean Std Dev 
Equity cost of 
capital 
2,810 0 0. 058 0. 099 0. 155 2.997 0. 123 0. 122 
CETR 2,810 -0.989 -0.387 -0. 264 -0.158 0 -0.290 0.188 
BETR 2,810 -1 -0.246 -0.142 -0.072 0 -0.181 0.160 
LnAT 2,810 14.94 20.18 21.54 23.17 29.17 21.75 2.227 
LnBMRatio 2,810 -5.456 -1.360 -0.816 -0.289 6.772 -0.863 0.897 
B_MRK 2,810 -0.099 0.002 0.006 0.011 0.068 0.007 0.009 
B_SMB 2,810 -0.116 -0.009 0.002 0.013 0.478 0.003 0.022 
B_HML 2,810 -0.431 -0.012 0.001 0.015 0.223 0.004 0.033 
Leverage 2,810 0 0.026 0.130 0.251 0.700 0.159 0.145 
PPEGT 2,810 -0.027 0.052 0.164 0.318 1.391 0.219 0.207 
ROA 2,810 -88.18 3.289 5.761 9.384 155.73 7.338 7.459 
Capex 2,810 -0.423 -0.065 -0.037 -0.020 0.022 -0.048 0.044 
Forecast_Bias 2,810 -0.651 -0.087 -0.051 -0.029 0.092 -0.067 0.060 
Analysts 2,810 1 5 11 20 43 12.98 9.604 
TA 2,810 -0.551 -0.042 -0.010 0.024 0.750 -0.005 0.074 
Trust 300 1.5 3.446 4.060 5.309 6.208 4.195 1.173 







      Table 3 - Model Variables and Tax Avoidance Measures Correlation Matrix           
                 
 Equity cost 
of capital 
CETR BETR LnAT LnBMRatio B_mkt B_smb B_hml Leverage PPEGT ROA Capex Forecast_Bias Analysts TA Trust 
Equity cost of 
capital 
1.000                
CETR -0.012 1.000               
BETR -0.078 0.063 1.000              
LnAT -0.037 -0.031 -0.018 1.000             
LnBMRatio 0.287 0.001 -0.096 0.166 1.000            
B_mkt 0.092 -0.037 -0.043 0.047 -0.018 1.000           
B_smb -0.008 0.018 -0.049 -0.121 -0.033 -0.181 1.000          
B_hml -0.050 0.019 -0.050 -0.034 -0.006 -0.421 0.227 1.000         
Leverage -0.007 0.015 -0.010 0.200 0.051 -0.033 -0.011 -0.038 1.000        
PPEGT 0.054 -0.026 0.103 0.027 0.063 -0.014 0.016 -0.024 0.256 1.000       
ROA -0.178 0.049 0.188 -0.205 -0.437 0.014 -0.015 -0.038 -0.237 -0.005 1.000      
Capex -0.026 0.006 0.043 0.234 -0.044 -0.018 0.031 0.021 -0.020 -0.110 0.014 1.000     
Forecast_Bias 0.128 -0.109 -0.245 0.244 0.487 0.006 0.028 0.047 0.268 -0.004 -0.792 -0.019 1.000    
Analysts -0.174 -0.110 -0.057 0.663 -0.116 0.018 -0.162 -0.070 0.135 0.004 -0.009 -0.085 0.031 1.000   
TA -0.059 0.032 0.129 -0.076 -0.049 -0.030 0.003 0.049 -0.129 -0.175 0.210 0.055 -0.336 -0.064 1.000  
Trust 0.072 0.053 0.041 -0.017 -0.092 0.057 0.042 -0.110 0.027 -0.089 0.101 0.081 -0.109 -0.072 -0.030 1.000 
                 
 
Notes: 






                 
Table 4 – OLS Regression Results 
        
Panel A: OLS regression results (dependent variable: Equity cost of capital, tax avoidance: 
CETR) 
    
 Prediction Low Medium High 
  Tax Avoidance Tax Avoidance Tax Avoidance 
CETR -/?/+ -0.018 0.110 0.223*** 
  (0.022) (0.065) (0.085) 
LnAT - -0.001 -0.007 -0.008 
  (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) 
LnBMRatio + 0.022*** 0.065* 0.006 
  (0.005) (0.036) (0.007) 
B_mkt + 0.565 -0.269 0.584 
  (0.358) (0.763) (0.441) 
B_smb + 0.490*** -0.618 0.248 
  (0.182) (1.014) (0.169) 
B_hml + 0.119 -0.152 0.093 
  (0.133) (0.358) (0.193) 
Leverage + 0.041 0.065 -0.104*** 
  (0.027) (0.059) (0.033) 
PPEGT ? -0.053** 0.057 0.061** 
  (0.023) (0.035) (0.027) 
ROA + -0.001 -0.000 -0.008 
  (0.002) (0.000) (0.005) 
Capex ? -0.050 0.383*** 0.027 
  (0.084) (0.097) (0.123) 
Forecast_Bias + -0.059 -0.309* -0.424 
  (0.174) (0.174) (0.376) 
Analysts - -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
TA - -0.010 -0.154** -0.122 
  (0.056) (0.073) (0.084) 
Trust ? -0.004 -0.009 0.003 
  (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) 
Constant  0.153** 0.375* 0.317*** 
  (0.076) (0.225) (0.122) 
Year Effects  YES YES YES 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
Industry Effects  YES YES YES 
Observations  925 947 773 






 Table 4 – OLS regression results 
 
   
Panel B: OLS regression results (dependent variable: Equity cost of capital, tax avoidance: 
BETR) 
    
 Prediction Low Medium High 
  Tax Avoidance Tax Avoidance Tax Avoidance 
BETR -/?/+ -0.112*** 0.032 0.341*** 
  (0.031) (0.078) (0.126) 
LnAT - -0.009 -0.002 -0.005 
  (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) 
LnBMRatio + 0.056 0.027*** 0.024*** 
  (0.039) (0.005) (0.006) 
B_mkt + -0.909 1.182*** 0.573 
  (0.846) (0.450) (0.406) 
B_smb + -0.330 0.323* 0.409** 
  (0.818) (0.188) (0.208) 
B_hml + -0.308 0.194 0.200 
  (0.231) (0.165) (0.158) 
Leverage + 0.007 0.004 -0.002 
  (0.034) (0.025) (0.025) 
PPEGT ? 0.047 0.001 0.030 
  (0.072) (0.018) (0.027) 
ROA + -0.008 -0.000 -0.001 
  (0.005) (0.000) (0.002) 
Capex ? 0.005 0.213** 0.165 
  (0.179) (0.100) (0.121) 
Forecast_Bias + -0.913 -0.088 -0.038 
  (0.593) (0.103) (0.211) 
Analysts - -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
TA - -0.069 -0.116* -0.046 
  (0.084) (0.070) (0.060) 
Trust ? 0.007 -0.000 -0.010 
  (0.014) (0.007) (0.010) 
Constant  0.308 0.167** 0.267*** 
  (0.218) (0.074) (0.091) 
Year Effects  YES YES YES 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
Industry Effects  YES YES YES 
Observations  827 978 840 
R-squared  0.302 0.310 0.292 
Notes:  
The results are from the estimation of equation  𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 +
𝛽2𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛𝐵𝑀𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵_𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵_𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵_ℎ𝑚𝑙𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 +
𝛽8𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐺𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡_𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 +
𝛽14𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑐,𝑡 +  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑐,𝑡    using CETR as tax avoidance measure and 
equation 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑐,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛𝐵𝑀𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐵_𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵_𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵_ℎ𝑚𝑙𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐺𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 +
𝛽10𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡_𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑐,𝑡 +  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 +
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 +  𝑒𝑖,𝑐,𝑡.   using BETR as tax avoidance measure. In both Panels the 
dependent variable is Equity cost of capital, the first column corresponds to firms engaged in lower levels 
of tax avoidance, the second column corresponds to Medium Tax Avoidance and the third column 
corresponds to firms which present higher levels of corporate tax avoidance. See Appendix A for variable 
definitions. Robust t-statistics in parentheses, ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 




Table 5 - The Role of Legal Origin 
        
Panel A: OLS regression results (dependent variable: Equity cost of capital, tax avoidance: 
CETR) 
       
  English  French  German Scandinavian 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High 
CETR -0.016 0.089 0.016 0.040 -0.034 0.008 -0.050 0.098 
 (0.014) (0.087) (0.027) (0.074) (0.038) (0.150) (0.043) (0.072) 
LnAT 0.000 0.006 0.004 0.007 -0.007 -0.030** -0.009 0.008 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) 
LnBMRatio -0.000 -0.004 0.013* -0.004 0.019* 0.134* 0.036*** 0.034*** 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.007) (0.015) (0.011) (0.078) (0.009) (0.007) 
B_mkt 0.553 0.103 0.183 1.688** 1.271*** 0.407 1.398 1.235* 
 (0.415) (0.466) (0.472) (0.698) (0.485) (0.911) (0.919) (0.646) 
B_smb 0.392 0.176 0.754*** 0.356 0.548** -1.304 0.133 0.332 
 (0.281) (0.292) (0.272) (0.337) (0.260) (1.160) (0.335) (0.312) 
B_hml 0.029 -0.396 0.113 0.412 0.105 -0.826* 0.428 0.507** 
 (0.067) (0.269) (0.201) (0.277) (0.210) (0.422) (0.341) (0.233) 
Leverage -0.001 0.003 -0.063* -0.059* 0.034 -0.059 0.067 -0.024 
 (0.013) (0.031) (0.036) (0.034) (0.041) (0.071) (0.049) (0.034) 
PPEGT 0.007 0.006 -0.016 0.057* -0.048 0.005 -0.040 0.049 
 (0.010) (0.025) (0.029) (0.031) (0.040) (0.057) (0.041) (0.034) 
ROA 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.013*** 0.002 0.004 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Capex 0.012 -0.231* 0.070 0.307*** 0.074 -0.051 0.067 -0.020 
 (0.046) (0.132) (0.147) (0.113) (0.169) (0.415) (0.120) (0.118) 
Forecast_Bias -0.000 0.137 0.042 -0.037 0.142 -1.591** 0.348 0.359 
 (0.033) (0.117) (0.107) (0.297) (0.133) (0.620) (0.360) (0.522) 
Analysts -0.000 -0.001 -0.002* -0.003*** -0.000 0.003 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
TA 0.002 0.082 -0.113** -0.071 -0.130 -0.101 0.247** -0.125* 
 (0.021) (0.085) (0.057) (0.098) (0.101) (0.139) (0.116) (0.068) 
Trust 0.790 0.014 -0.018 -0.015 -0.021 0.009 -0.012 -0.011 
 (0.727) (0.438) (0.020) (0.018) (0.024) (0.038) (0.011) (0.014) 
Constant -3.292 -0.153 0.167 0.032 0.347* 0.820*** 0.374*** 0.059 
 (3.027) (1.802) (0.114) (0.147) (0.202) (0.314) (0.126) (0.148) 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 147 156 374 364 383 374 316 307 






 Table 5 - The Role of Legal Origin       
        
Panel B: OLS regression results (dependent variable: Equity cost of capital, tax avoidance: 
BETR) 
       
  English  French  German Scandinavian 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High 
BETR 0.010 0.069 -0.064* -0.048 -0.152** -0.067 -0.041 -0.072 
 (0.011) (0.111) (0.033) (0.126) (0.067) (0.121) (0.035) (0.169) 
LnAT 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.009 -0.031** -0.013** -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
LnBMRatio -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.011 0.150** 0.019* 0.035*** 0.041*** 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.075) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) 
B_mkt 0.269 0.574 0.349 1.452** -0.841 1.359* 0.469 2.511*** 
 (0.197) (0.649) (0.494) (0.663) (1.104) (0.784) (0.663) (0.810) 
B_smb 0.146 -0.225 0.566** 0.219 -1.662 0.666*** 0.168 0.959*** 
 (0.103) (0.499) (0.261) (0.425) (1.182) (0.239) (0.312) (0.335) 
B_hml 0.016 -0.182 0.256 0.305* -1.382** -0.051 0.164 0.863*** 
 (0.028) (0.266) (0.233) (0.169) (0.547) (0.239) (0.242) (0.324) 
Leverage -0.003 0.044 -0.022 -0.062* -0.074 0.009 0.061 0.006 
 (0.007) (0.033) (0.039) (0.034) (0.074) (0.053) (0.047) (0.035) 
PPEGT -0.005 -0.015 0.040 0.037 -0.044 -0.070* -0.078** 0.047 
 (0.006) (0.022) (0.034) (0.034) (0.069) (0.041) (0.034) (0.035) 
ROA 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 0.005 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Capex -0.035 -0.284* 0.322** 0.199 -0.366 0.027 -0.031 0.051 
 (0.026) (0.148) (0.156) (0.127) (0.360) (0.341) (0.134) (0.098) 
Forecast_Bias -0.008 0.140 0.085 -0.287 -0.703 -0.351 -0.049 0.582 
 (0.034) (0.110) (0.130) (0.236) (0.708) (0.528) (0.356) (0.610) 
Analysts -0.001 -0.001 -0.003*** -0.003** 0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
TA -0.008 0.063 -0.098 -0.024 0.112 -0.096 0.064 -0.013 
 (0.014) (0.093) (0.066) (0.118) (0.146) (0.115) (0.090) (0.084) 
Trust 0.080 0.456 -0.005 -0.030 0.071 -0.015 -0.004 -0.016 
 (0.164) (0.833) (0.018) (0.021) (0.048) (0.027) (0.012) (0.012) 
Constant -0.379 -1.941 0.112 0.052 0.630** 0.473** 0.205 0.293** 
 (0.694) (3.459) (0.112) (0.154) (0.259) (0.216) (0.145) (0.136) 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 149 155 359 379 375 382 312 311 
R-squared 0.083 0.148 0.261 0.186 0.409 0.139 0.246 0.358 
Notes:  
English stands for English common law, French stands for French civil law, German stands for German 
civil law and Scandinavian stands for Scandinavian civil law. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 






 Table 6 – Robustness Check 
 
   
Panel A: OLS regression results (dependent variable: Equity cost of capital, tax avoidance: 
CETR) 
    
 Prediction Low Medium High 
  Tax Avoidance Tax Avoidance Tax Avoidance 
CETR -/?/+ -0.010 0.021 0.092* 
  (0.017) (0.042) (0.048) 
LnAT - 0.003 0.002 0.000 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
LnBMRatio + 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
B_mkt + 0.386 0.363 0.295 
  (0.271) (0.260) (0.322) 
B_smb + 0.274* 0.285** 0.259** 
  (0.150) (0.131) (0.116) 
B_hml + 0.194** 0.177 0.029 
  (0.098) (0.132) (0.129) 
Leverage + 0.015 -0.004 -0.055*** 
  (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
PPEGT ? -0.031* 0.012 0.031** 
  (0.018) (0.015) (0.012) 
ROA + -0.000 0.000 -0.001 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Capex ? -0.043 0.271*** 0.120** 
  (0.076) (0.067) (0.052) 
Forecast_Bias + 0.063 -0.014 -0.040 
  (0.063) (0.043) (0.070) 
Analysts - -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
TA - -0.027 -0.089** -0.020 
  (0.038) (0.039) (0.035) 
Trust ? 0.000 -0.000 -0.007 
  (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
Constant  0.082 0.101** 0.178*** 
  (0.052) (0.050) (0.068) 
Year Effects  YES YES YES 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
Industry Effects  YES YES YES 
Observations  894 921 742 





 Table 6 – Robustness Check 
 
   
Panel B: OLS regression results (dependent variable: Equity cost of capital, tax avoidance: 
BETR) 
    
 Prediction Low Medium High 
  Tax Avoidance Tax Avoidance Tax Avoidance 
BETR -/?/+ -0.057*** 0.098* 0.111 
  (0.017) (0.057) (0.083) 
LnAT - 0.004* -0.000 -0.002 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
LnBMRatio + 0.002 0.011*** 0.023*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
B_mkt + -0.012 0.883*** 0.253 
  (0.265) (0.325) (0.322) 
B_smb + 0.251* 0.181 0.303** 
  (0.132) (0.130) (0.135) 
B_hml + 0.049 0.122 0.207* 
  (0.104) (0.130) (0.109) 
Leverage + -0.017 0.012 -0.027* 
  (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) 
PPEGT ? -0.004 0.011 0.004 
  (0.021) (0.015) (0.013) 
ROA + -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Capex ? 0.062 0.112 0.193*** 
  (0.084) (0.074) (0.052) 
Forecast_Bias + 0.119* 0.057 -0.118* 
  (0.072) (0.056) (0.062) 
Analysts - -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TA - -0.021 0.007 -0.083** 
  (0.040) (0.040) (0.034) 
Trust ? 0.008 -0.005 -0.006 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Constant  0.027 0.160*** 0.202*** 
  (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) 
Year Effects  YES YES YES 
Country Effects  YES YES YES 
Industry Effects  YES YES YES 
Observations  803 945 809 
R-squared  0.410 0.372 0.319 
Notes:  
92 observations were considered as outliers due to excessive cost of capital and were excluded from the 
main model. Standard deviation was used to detect these 92 outliers, any observation that exhibits more 
than two standard deviations was considered an outlier. See Appendix A for variable definitions. Robust 
t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
